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NOTES
MANUFACTURED DIVERSITY-APPOINTMENT
OF A NONRESIDENT FIDUCIARY
REPRESENTATIVE IN ORDER TO CREATE
FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION

A great portion of the cases heard in federal district courts
today arrive there by way of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction pursuant to section 13321 of the Federal Judiciary Act.
The abuses of diversity jurisdiction have been many, but no one
abuse has been so flagrant as manufactured diversity.2 Manufactured diversity, sometimes called artificial diversity, exists
when a representative is appointed to provide the requisite
diversity lacked by the party he represents, necessary to have
the action brought in federal district court. Courts have almost
consistently sustained jurisdiction when the appointed party has
been a fiduciary representative, as a general guardian, executor
or administrator, or a trustee. In MeSparran ov. TVeis8t, 3 however,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied jurisdiction
in a situation involving manufactured diversity by appointment
of a nonresident guardian, stating that section 1359 of the
Judiciary Act denied jurisdiction in cases in which diversity
had been "improperly or collusively" made. 4 In so doing, the
court overruled its own landmark decision of Co'rabi 'v. Avto
Racing, In. 5
It is the purpose of this article to consider both the practice
of manufacturing diversity jurisdiction by appointing a nonresident fiduciary to represent a resident beneficiary, and the
effect of section 1359 on this practice. It is felt that the proper
interpretation of section 1359 will apply equally to administrators and executors, general guardians, and trustees even
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).

2. For a general discussion of the history of manufactured diversity and
a criticism, see Cohan & Tate, Manufacturing Federal Diversity Jurisdiction
by the Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriety, 1 VILL.
L. REv. 201 (1956).

3. 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).

5. 264 F2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959); Annot., 75 A.L.R2d 711 (1961).
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though their functions and modes of appointment differ. Situations involving assignments of claims made to create diversity,
however, are outside the scope of this article and will not be
considered because different criteria are used to determine when
an assignment comes within section 1359. 6
II. TmH

HISTORY OF DIvEmITY JuRmSDIcTION

The Constitution of the United States provides that "[t]he
judicial Power shall extend to all . . . Controversies . . . be,,7 The first Congress
tween citizens of different States ....

exercised this grant of power by including a provision for
diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.8 Congress
thereby gave federal courts of original jurisdiction the power to
hear cases in which diversity of citizenship existed, although, of
course, the states had concurrent jurisdiction. "[N]either the
debates of the Constitutional Convention nor the records of the
First Congress shed any substantial light on why such jurisdiction was granted by the Constitution or why the First Congress
exercised its option to vest such jurisdiction." 9 To this day,
there is no agreement as to why diversity jurisdiction was
created or what justifies its present existence.1"

While the reasons for the existence of diversity jurisdiction
are obscure and disputed, the most frequently heard and most
widely accepted explanation is that diversity jurisdiction was
created to protect nonresident litigants from local prejudice in
state courts. Support for this explanation can be found in Bank
6. This difference is due to the fact that assignments are commercial in
nature, and the only result of an assignment could be to achieve diversity

status, thus requiring the courts to consider whether the transfer was real
and complete. In the case of a fiduciary representative, the appointment is
accompanied by certain duties imposed by state law, irrespective of the motives
for appointment. Traditionally, courts have dealt more harshly with attempts
to gain access to federal courts by assignment than with similar attempts
involving appointment of fiduciary representatives. See Caribbean Mills, Inc.
v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968).
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
8. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat 73.
9. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23, at 64

(West 1963).

10. For a general discussion of the history of diversity jurisdiction and the
propriety of its current existence, see Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HAnv. L. Rxv. 483 (1928); Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary
Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 869 (1931); 1 J.
MooRE, FEDERAL Pa~crIcE ff 0.71 at 701.10-.80 (2d ed. 1964); 1 BARRON &
HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26, at 131-56 (Wright ed.
1960); C. WRaGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23, at 64-69
(West 1963).
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of the United States v. Deveaux,1 ' an opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall. However, some writers argue that there is no evidence
that such prejudice was present in state courts at the time the
2
Constitution was written.1

From a very early date, it was recognized that the citizenship
of a fiduciary representative, rather than the citizenship of the
beneficiary, was controlling for purposes of determining the
existence of diversity citizenship. In (Chappedelaine v. Dechemzux,1 3 decided in 1808, Chief Justice Marshall upheld jurisdiction in a case in which the plaintiffs were nonresident (alien)
trustees even though the citizenship of the plaintiff's beneficiary
was the same as that of the defendant. 14 Since that date it has
been consistently held that the citizenship of the representative
is determinative of the presence of diversity-whether the representative be a trustee,' 5 or executor or administrator, 6 or a
general guardian. 1'7 (It should be noted that only a general
guardian's citizenship is determinative. In cases of lesser
guardians, such as guardians ad litem, the citizenship of the
beneficiary is looked to for diversity purposes.)' 8 The problem
under consideration arises when a fiduciary representative is
appointed solely for the purpose of manufacturing diversity,
which his beneficiary lacks, in reliance on the above principles.
The question to be determined is whether such an appointment
comes within the meaning of section 1359 which denies jurisdiction in cases in which a party has been improperly or collusively
made in order to obtain jurisdiction. 9
11. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).

12. E.g., Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41

HARV.

L. REv. 483, 497 (1928).
13. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306 (1808).
14. Id. at 308.
15. Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U.S. 451 (1892); Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S.

(11 Wall.) 172 (1871).
16. Rice v. Houston, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 66 (1871); Childress v. Emory,

21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642 (1823).

17. Mexican Central Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903).

18. E.g., Appelt v. Whitty, 286 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1961).

19. Why do litigants often prefer to have their cases decided in federal
courts? The chief reason is that verdicts are frequently larger in federal courts
than in state courts. Additionally, the rules of evidence and discovery are more
liberal, and federal judges may comment on the evidence and have more free-

dom to direct verdicts. The method of selection of federal judges makes them

less susceptible to local influences and prejudices. There are three less worthy
reasons for preferring federal tribunals. First, because the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allow a more complete presentation of the evidence, a party
may prolong a trial with an accompanying increase in court costs. Second,
the greater distances to federal courts can work an inconvenience on the
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JumRISDICTION STATUTES

The pertinent portions of the present diversity statute, section
1332, read:
(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and cost, and is between-(1) citizens of different
states; ... 20
One of the major judicially imposed limits on this statute is the
requirement of "complete" diversity, first enunciated in Straw2' in 1806. Complete diversity
bridge v. Curtk&
means that all
parties on one side must have citizenship diverse from aZ of the
parties on the opposing side. Also, the burden of proving diversity falls on the party seeking to take advantage of federal
jurisdiction.
Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest." Rule 17(a) also permits a personal representative to sue in his own name without joining the beneficiary. Rule 17(b) states that the representative's capacity to
sue or be sued is to be determined by the law of the state in
which the district court is held. Rule 17(c) says that an infant
or incompetent can be represented by his guardian, committee,
or conservator. If the infant or incompetent has no such representative, he may be represented by his next friend or guardian
ad litem. Several cases can be found discussing problems of
section 1359 in terms of whether or not the nominal plaintiff
(the representative) is the "real party in interest." 22 This approach ignores the fact that the Federal Rules deal with procedure-not jurisdiction. "A rule of procedure . . . is without
opposing party. Third, appeals in federal courts generally involve greater
expenses than a similar appeal in a state court.
For a general discussion of why litigants might prefer to have their cases

heard in federal court, see Cohen & Tate, Manufacturing Federal Diversity
Jtrisdictiot; by the Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and Propriety, 1 VInL L. REv. 201, 239-40 (1956) and C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTs § 31, at 84 (West 1963).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). This section also grants jurisdiction in cases
in which a citizen of a state is involved in an action with a foreign state or
citizen.
21. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
22. E.g., Ferrara v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000, 1004
n.1 (D. Vt. 1967).
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efficacy to extend the jurisdiction of a court." 23 "It is elementary that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is neither
enlarged nor restrained by [Rule 17] . . ."24 Instead "[tihe
focus of . . . [Rule 17] is on the capacity to sue, and it does

not purport to establish standards for the determination of
diversity of citizenship . .

.

.Rule 82 expressly states [that the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedurel do not affect the jurisdiction
of district courts." 25 Therefore, whatever the effect of section
1359 may be on the problem of manufactured diversity in cases
involving personal representatives, it is not influenced by Rule
17. The fact that the personal representative who brings the
action is the "real party in interest" will not prevent the action
from being "collusive" within the meaning of section 1359.2 6
Section 1359 currently provides that "[a] district court shall
not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by
assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court. 2" This

section was adopted as part of the 1948 revision of the Judicial
Code and serves as a restriction on the use of section 1332. Section 1359 "and its progenitors [have] led a long and troubled
life. ' 28 It was derived from section 41(1) and 80 of 28 United
States Code (1941 edition). Section 41(1) was an anti-assignment statute which had its origins in the first Judiciary Act of
1789.29 Section 80 was first enacted in 1875.30 In addition to the
language of the present statute which speaks in terms of parties
"improperly or collusively" made, section 80 contained a phrase
providing for dismissal of an action when the court found "that
such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or
controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said district
court."3 1 This phrase was omitted from the 1948 revision as
23. Dery v. Wyer, 265 F2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1959).
24. Rock Drilling, Blasting, Etc. v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217 F.2d 687, 693
(2d Cir. 1954).
25. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 870 (3d Cir. 1968).
26. Birkins v. Seaboard Service, 96 F. Supp. 245 (D.N.J. 1950); 3 J.
MoopE, FunmuL PRACTICE 17.03, at 1320 (2d ed. 1953).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
28. Ferrara v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (D.
Vt. 1967), aff'd on opinion below, 393 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1968).
29. Act of September 24, 1789 ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73.
30. Act of March 3, 1875 ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472.
31. The predecessor of section 1359, the former 28 U.S.C. § 80, read:
If in any suit commenced in district court, or removed from a
State court to a district court of the TUnited States, it shall appear
to the satisfaction of the said district court, at any time after such
suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not
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unnecessary because it was felt that a court would always dismiss an action not within its jurisdiction--either on counsel's
motion or even on its own motion. 2 This omitted phrase is not
unimportant in the interpretation of the present statute, as will
be seen.
IV. MAUFACTUr
Divmsrry
The amended version of the anti-collusion statute, section
1359, "would seem an effective barrier against the manufacturer
of diversity, whether by assignment or by any other device but
the decisions of case law have rendered section 1359 largely
33
ineffective."
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit first had occasion
to deal with the problem of manufactured diversity, as affected
by section 1359, in Jaffe v. Philadelphia& Western Railroad
o.34 In that case an administratrix, a New Jersey citizen,

brought in federal court a wrongful death action on behalf
of her deceased against a Pennsylvania citizen. The administratrix was a stenographer in the office of the attorney of the
deceased's widow. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that so
long as the administratrix was properly appointed and had a
right to bring the action under state law, the motive of her
appointment was immaterial. The administratrix's citizenship
was determinative of the existence of diversity jurisdiction, and
such an appointment was not collusive within the meaning of
section 1359. In Fallat v. Goura. 5 the Third Circuit again
seemingly approved of manufactured diversity.
The most detailed examination given to section 1359 and the
problem of manufactured diversity was in Corabi v. Auto Racing, In.,ss a landmark decision by the Court of Appeals for
really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly
within the jurisdiction of said district court, or that parties to
said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined,
either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a
case cognizable or removable under this chapter, the said district
court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit
or remand it to the court from which it was removed, as justice
may require, and shall make such order as to costs as shall be
just.
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472.
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964) (revisor's notes).
33. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 31, at 86
(West 1963).
34. 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
35. 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).

36. 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 711 (1961).
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Third Circuit which has been extensively relied on in other
jurisdictions. There, a minor who was a Pennsylvania resident
was killed when a wheel detached from a race car and struck
him as he sat in a grandstand. The Register of Wills granted
letters of administration to the deceased minor's mother, also a
Pennsylvania resident. Later the Orphan's Court permitted the
mother to resign expressly for the purpose of enabling the court
to appoint a nonresident as administrator d.b.n. in order that
a wrongful death action could be brought in federal district
court. When the nonresident administrator d.b.n. brought the
action in federal district court, the defendant moved to dismiss
on the ground that diversity jurisdiction had been "simulated"
by the parties because the administrator d.b.n. had been appointed solely to create federal diversity jurisdiction. The
defendant maintained that this appointment was collusive
within the meaning of section 1359. The district court denied
the motion and certified the matter to the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.3 7 On appeal, the court, sitting en banc,

held that the appointment of a nonresident administrator d.b.n.
for the sole and expressed purpose of creating jurisdiction was
not "collusive" or "improper" within the meaning of these terms
as used in section 1359.
Corabi examined the meanings of the words "improperly"
and "collusively" and determined that
[t]he word "collusive" is a strong one. The term "collusion" indicated "A secret agreement and cooperation
for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose; deceit; fraud."
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2 ed
...... "An
agreement between two or more persons to defraud a
person of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an
object forbidden by law." [Also from Webster's Dictionary]. 88
The court reasoned that it could not be within the meaning of
the term "collusive" to use openly a state law in an attempt to
obtain a higher verdict in federal court. It considered "collusive" to be understood generally to consist of an illegal agreement between opposing counsel. The court decided the word
"improperly" meant not well suited for the circumstances or
having a connotation of impropriety. Guided by this logic,
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
38. Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir. 1959).
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Corabi concluded that, had Congress meant to achieve a contrary result, it would have simply omitted the two words
"improperly" and "collusively" from the statute.
The effect of Corabi on section 1359 has been nothing less
than catastrophic:
By focusing on the literal meanings of the two words
the court virtually emasculated the statute, for it is
doubtful that any of the cases reflect collusion in the
sense of fraud or deceit, collusion with the other opposing party or impropriety in the sense of indecorum
or indecency.3 9
The rationale of Jaffe and Corabi,moreover, led to great abuses
of diversity jurisdiction. For example, in one case, it developed
that the plaintiff had also appeared as the administrator in
40
thirty-three other civil actions in federal court.
Following Corabi, however, other circuit courts "uniformly
ruled that a party's actions were not 'improper' or 'collusive'
within the meaning of [section 1359], even though the sole
motive [of the appointment] was to gain access to federal court,
if the actions were lawful in themselves." 4' So, even where a
fiduciary representative was appointed solely and admittedly
to manufacture diversity, jurisdiction was uniformly sustained
by the circuit courts-whether the representative be a general
44
43
guardian, 42 an executor or administrator, or a trustee.

The only major case to the contrary was the 1949 decision of
Martineau v. City of St. Paul,45 decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In Martineau the appointment of
a general guardian for purposes of creating diversity was said
39. Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 1968). The
court in McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), however, admitted
that "Corabi [had] become a leading case and [was] the authoritative foundation for the maintenance of manufactured diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 872.
40. Jamison v. Kammerer, 264 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1959).
41. C. WRIGHT, HAND1301 OF THE LAW OF THE FEDmAL COURTS § 31, at

86 (West 1963).

42. Stephen v. Marlin Firearms Co., 325 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'g on
opinion below, 217 F. Supp. 880 (D. Conn. 1963) ; Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d
325 (3d Cir. 1954).
43. Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn.), aff'd 324
F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir.
1959); Jamison v. Kammerer, 264 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
813 (1959); McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954); Jaffe v. Philadelphia & Western R.R., 180 F2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
44. County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961).

45. 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).
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to be within the prohibition of section 1359. Its remarks about
section 1359, however, appear in an alternative holding and
were made without a detailed consideration of the statute.
Martineau was not subsequently followed by that circuit46 and
has been distinguished on the ground that the guardian was a
4
mere agent of the probate court under Minnesota law '

Finally, in MeSparran, the Third Circuit reconsidered its
prior decisions of Jaffe and Corabi.
Richard Riegner, a minor and resident of Pennsylvania, was
injured in a collision while riding in an automobile driven by
the defendant, Jeffery Weist, also a Pennsylvania resident.
Stella McSparran, a resident of New Jersey, was appointed
guardian for Richard Riegner by the Orphan's Court of Berks
County, Pennsylvania. The guardian was a straw party and was
chosen solely for the purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction
as was later conceded on appeal. Under the decisions of the
Third Circuit and, indeed, the other circuits, such an appointment was an accepted method for obtaining federal jurisdiction.
The injuries sued upon, moreover, were well within the statutory
jurisdictional amount of $10,000.48 At trial, however, the district

judge dismissed the action so that the judgment would be final,
as required for an appeal,49 in order that the court of appeals
could rule on the question of whether Richard's mother could
bring a suit for out-of-pocket medical expenses "pendent" to
Richard's action. 0
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, en
banc, dismissed the entire action--on jurisdictional grounds!
The court side-stepped the question of pendent jurisdiction and
held that the appointment of a nonresident guardian sorely for
the purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction was improper and
collusive within the meaning of section 1359, requiring dismissal of the action for want of jurisdiction. The court, moreover, expressly overruled Jaffe v. Philadelphia c Western Railroad Co.51 and Cora7i v. Auto Racing, Inc. 52 which had pre46. See, e.g., McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954). This case was

decided without mentioning the contrary decision in Martineau, decided five
years earlier.

47. County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964).
49.
50.
51.
52.

28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964).
270 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
180 F2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
264 F2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).
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viously held such manufactured diversity not to be within the
scope of section 1359. These prior decisions had been extensively
relied on in similar decisions in other circuits.53
Two judges dissented from the McSparran decision. Senior
Judge Biggs, author of the opinion in 6orabi, who was disqualified" from participating in the rehearing of McSparran
because he had not participated in the first arguments of that
case, expressed his disapproval of the majority opinion in a
companion case decided that same day.55
The court placed great weight on the preliminary words of
section 80 of 28 United States Code (1941 edition) which were
omitted from section 1359.5" The court cited the revisor's notes
which stated that no alteration in the meaning of the section
was intended by the omission and that the omitted words were
felt to be unnecessary. Relying on this, the court concluded that
these omitted, preliminary words gave meaning to
otherwise indefinite and ambiguous words "improperly" or "collusively". They say in effect that a nominal
party designated simply for the purpose of creating
diversity of citizenship, who has no real or substantial
interest in the dispute or controversy, is improperly or
collusively named.52 '
Corabi and the other "restrictive" views of section 1359 felt
that to look at the motives of an appointment would contravene
the dictates of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Mecom v. Fitzsimmons,58 which provided that a state probate
decree could not be collaterally attacked by questioning the
motive behind the decree of appointment. MHSparran distinguished Mecom on the ground it did not deal with the anticollusion statute because the appointment was made to avoid
diversity, while the statute only applied to situations aimed at
creating diversity.5 9

53. See, e.g., Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 324 F2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963),
arms Co., 325 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'g on opinion below, 217 F. Supp.
880 (D. Conn. 1963) ; Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1962) ; County
affg per curiam, 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn. 1963); Stephen v. Marlin Fireof Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961).

54. 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1964).

55. Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878, 880 (3d Cir. 1968).
56. For full text of the revised section see .supra note 31.
57. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 873 (3d Cir. 1968).

58. 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
59. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 885 (3d Cir. 1968). Moreover, it is
hard to see why refusing to recognize the citizenship of a straw party for
diversity purposes is in any way collaterally impugning the decree of a state
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Two important Supreme Court decisions have dealt with
sections 41(1) and 80 of the United States Code (1941 edition),
the predecessor of section 1359: Black &f White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.4 and
Lehigh Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Kelley.61 These two
cases seem, upon initial consideration, to come to conflicting
results. Black& White Taxicab was cited in Corabi and subsequent cases as permitting manufactured diversity while Lehigh
would seem to support an argument against manufactured
diversity.
In Lehigh, officers and shareholders of a Virginia corporation formed a Pennsylvania corporation which had identical
shareholders with the Virginia corporation. Al interests of the
Virginia corporation were transferred to the new corporation
without consideration, leaving the old corporation in existence.
This transfer of assets was made to create a case cognizable in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The shareholders of
the Virginia (plaintiff) corporation could have required the
Pennsylvania corporation to convey to the Virginia corporation
any recovery which might be had in court. The Court held this
to be a fraud on the Court in violation of the predecessor of
section 1359. A similar result was reached in Miller c&Lux v.
East Side Canal & Irrigation Co. 62
The Corabi court said it "would consider the decisions in
Lehigh Mining ... and Miller & L x as persuasive were it not
for the later decision of the Supreme Court in [Black; & 'White
Taxicab] ....
In Black & White Taxicab, a suit was brought
in federal court by a Tennessee corporation against two Kentucky corporations to enjoin interference with contract rights.
A similar dispute had existed between one of the defendants and
the plaintiff's predecessor, also a Kentucky corporation, which
had formed the Tennessee corporation and transferred its interest to the Tennessee corporation so that the action could be
brought in federal court. The major factual distinction between
Black & -White Taxicab and Lehigh was that the parent cor"63

court. This in no way questions the representative's right to bring the suit by
virtue of his nominal status, any more than does looking to the citizenship of

the beneficiary in the case of a guardian ad litem who has traditionally been
considered only a nominal party.

60. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
61. 64 F. 401, affd 160 U.S. 327 (1894).
62. 211 U.S. 293 (1908).
63. Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F2d 784, 787 (3d Cir. 1959).
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poration of Black &6 White had been dissolved, whereas in
Lehigh the predecessor corporation remained in existence. The
Supreme Court refused to dismiss Black & White Taxicab for
want of jurisdiction upon finding that "[t]he succession and
transfer were actual, not feigned or merely colorable. In these
circumstances, courts will not inquire into motives when deciding their jurisdiction."8 4 In Corabi, the circuit court decided it
was prevented from inquiring into the motives of the appointment because it believed the facts of Gorabi fell within the
ambit of Black & White Taxicab. The court felt that the appointment of the representative was "actual, not feigned or
merely colorable," presumably because under state law the appointment was bona fide and because the representative had
actual duties imposed on him by state law. This logic was followed by other circuits to avoid coming within Lehigh's interpretation of section 1359's predecessor.
MoSparran distinguished Black & White Taxicab on its facts
by saying that in Black & White Taxicab the new corporation,
which was created to make diversity jurisdiction possible, was
not a mere "straw--instead the transaction was a real one
which had significance beyond the existence of diversity jurisdiction. The court then pointed out that in McSparan the
record on its face showed a "naked arrangement" and nothing
more. Therefore, the court reasoned, the situation in McSparran
came within Lehigh in which the Supreme Court permitted
motive to be considered when deciding if an appointment came
within the purview of the forerunner of section 1359 (which
MoSparran had decided was not substantially changed by the
1948 revision).
The factual distinctions between Lehigh and Black & -White
Taxicab are apparent, but the court's distinction between Black
& 'White Taxicab and the facts of McSparran are less than
convincing. As Senior Circuit Judge Biggs points out in his
dissent from Esposito v. Emery 5 a companion case to Mc,Sparran:
What palpable difference is there between having a
single asset transferred by operation of law to the
guardian of the estate of a minor and having all assets
64. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928).
65. 402 F2d 878 (3d Cir. 1968).
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of one corporation transferred to another corporation
by action of a board of directors and, probably, stockholders16
Under the MeSparran decision, collusion is not limited to
improper conduct between opposing parties, but will include
actions by only one side designed to create diversity jurisdiction. McSparran does not say, however, that any appointment of
a representative for the purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction will be violative of section 1359. Instead, the decision seems
to be limited to cases involving a straw party-a naked arrangement aimed solely at creating diversity jurisdiction. The desire
to create diversity is not in itself improper and ordinarily the
motives behind the appointment of a representative will not be
considered. But, in a case in which diversity jurisdiction is
dependent on the citizenship of a representative whose citizenship is different from that of his beneficiary, McSparran says
motive will be considered in order to determine if the representative is a mere straw party. The district court will look
to determine whether the considerations which normally lead
to the selection of such a representative by the local court are
present. Factors important in such a determination would indude: Did the representative have the capacity to manage the
property of the beneficiary? What were his past experiences in
such matters? Does he have any real duty or function to offer,
other than the use of his citizenship in a diversity action?
Would the appointing court normally appoint someone who
would be absent from its jurisdictional control? The burden of
proof will be on the party asserting diversity jurisdiction to
show that the nonresident fiduciary is more than a straw party.
If this burden is not met, the representative will not be treated
as a true fiduciary and the citizenship of the beneficiary will
be determinative.
Because of reliance on its earlier decisions by parties to many
pending cases, the court provided that the Me1parranz decision
would only be applied prospectively. The court provided further that in cases pending before district courts, the new criteria
for interpreting section 1359 would not be applied where it
would be too late to bring that action in a state tribunal or
where dismissal would place an unreasonable burden on the
plaintiff. The majority opinion in McSparran speaks of "re66. Id. at 882.
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lieving the federal courts of the overwhelming burden" of cases
that more properly belong in state courts in order that the federal courts will be free to handle truly federal cases. This will
likely prove an illusory work saving device, however, because
in each case involving diversity based on the citizenship of a
representative, the district court will be required to examine the
facts and take evidence in order to determine if the fiduciary
is a straw party. The court's task will be made difficult by
efforts of the parties to make a fiduciary look "real." In the
past, counsel's briefs have openly admitted the purpose behind
an appointment. This was done in reliance on the prior decisions
which indicated that an appointment could not be improper or
collusive if it was done openly.
While purporting to abolish the "manufacturer" of
diversity jurisdiction, the majority rule would elevate
such manufacturing to an art difficult to define and
0 7
even more difficult to combat
V.

ONCLUsION

Weighing the relative merits of the Corabi approach as compared with that of AfSparran, one is faced with an agonizing
dilemma. The rationale of Corabi and other related decisions
had the inherent advantage of certainty. At the same time these
decisions made possible, abuses of diversity jurisdiction. In
theory, MeS'parran will end these abuses, but it will create a
lack of certainty and will surely prove difficult to enforce.
While McSparran'sdistinction of Black & White Taxicab from
the instant case is somewhat falacious, the end McSparran seeks
to accomplish is admirable. There appears no logical reason why
such a case as was presented in MoSpaman should be heard in
federal court. The nonresident representative can hardly say
that his case will be influenced adversely by local prejudice
because the jury will be well aware that he represents a local
beneficiary or a local deceased. Thus, the basic explanation for
the justification of diversity jurisdiction, local prejudice, is
lacking. Furthermore, under the doctrine of Eqrie Railroad
Oo. v. Tompkins0 8 the federal judges are required to apply state
law, a body of law with which state judges may be more
qualified to deal.
67. Id.
68. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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A solution compatible with the principles underlying diversity jurisdiction has been offered by the American Law Institute. It proposes that the Judicial Code be amended to attribute
the same citizenship to a fiduciary representative as the decedent
or beneficiary he represents.6 9 As pointed out, a local jury will
hardly be prejudiced against a nonresident representative who
represents a local decedent or beneficiary. And, even if such

prejudice does exist, it is hardly important when compared with
all the other prejudices with which litigants contend today such
as social, racial, and political-not to mention the prejudice
which exists against large corporations. Furthermore, the fourteenth amendment is often available to grant federal relief
whenever such prejudice can be shown.
The decision in MeSparran is indicative of a developing trend
toward abolishing manufactured diversity 3 There now exists
a split of authority in the opinions in the circuit courts on this
matter which will most certainly be resolved by the Supreme
Court.
HEm y B. RICHAmRDSoN, JR.

69. ALI, Study of the Division of JurisdictionBetween the State and Fed-

eral Courts, pt. 1 § 1301(6)(4) (1965).
70. See dictum in Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir.
1958) indicating disapproval of the Corabi interpretation of section 1359.
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